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ARTICLES
New York's New "Son of Sam-"
Law-Does It Effectively Protect the
Rights of Crime Victims to Seek
Redress from Their Perpetrators?
Mark A. Conrad*
To the relief of many in the publishing and broadcast industries,
the United States Supreme Court overturned New York's so-called
"Son of Sam" law, a statute that required publishers to turn over
monies to be paid to criminals for the sale of their "thoughts,
feelings, opinions or emotions regarding [their] crimes."' The
Court not only found New York's statute constitutionally defective
due to its overbreadth, but it also jeopardized similar laws in over
forty other states.2
* Assistant Professor of Law, Fordham University Graduate School of Business
Administration; City College of New York, B.A. 1978; New York Law School, I.D. 1981;
Graduate School of Journalism, Columbia University, M.S. 1982.
1. N.Y. EXEc. LAW § 632-a (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1992). See Deborah Pines,
Son of Sam Law Ruled Unconstitutional, N.Y. L., Dec. 11, 1991, at 1; Paul M. Barrett,
High Court Rejects 'Son of Sam' Law, Citing Criminals' Rights of Free Speech, WALl
ST. 3., Dec. 11, 1991, at A4.
2. See ALA. CODE §§ 41-9-80 to -81 (1991); ALASKA STAT. § 12.61.020 (1990);
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4202 (1989); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-308 (Michie 1987);
CAL. CM. CODE § 2225 (West Supp. 1992); COLO. REV. STAT. §8 24-4.1-201 to -207
(1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-218 (West 1985); DEL. CODE ANN. fit. 11, §§
9101-9106 (1987 & Supp. 1990); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.512 (West Supp. 1992); GA.
CODE ANN. §§ 17-14-30 to -32 (1990); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 351-81 to -88 (Supp. 1991);
IDAHO CODE § 19-5301 (1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 70, para. 411 (Smith-Hurd 1989);
IND. CODE ANN. §§ 12-18-7-1 to -6 (Bums 1992); IOWA CODE ANN. § 910.15 (West
Supp. 1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 74-7319 to -7321 (Supp. 1991); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 346.165 (MichiefBobbs-Merrill 1983); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 46:1831 to :1839 (West
1982 & Supp. 1992); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 764 (1987 & Supp. 1991); MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 258A, § 8 (Law. Co-op. 1992); MICH. COM. LAWS ANN. § 780.768 (West
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Shortly after the decision in Simon & Schuster v. Members of
the New York State Crime Victims Board,3 the New York legisla-
tare passed, and Governor Mario Cuomo signed into law, a new
bill that will replace the constitutionally defective New York
Executive Law section 632-a with a new, identically numbered
section. The new measure4 permits crime victims to sue perpetra-
tors for civil damages up to seven years from the date of a
criminal's release from jail or, if the perpetrator was not incarcerat-
ed, seven years from the date of the offense. To facilitate such
private causes of action, the law effectively creates a judgment lien
in the assets of a convict with collateral estoppel effect,6 and
eliminates a sentencing court's ability to waive restitution and
reparation as a disposition in criminal cases.7
Governor Cuomo, at the signing of the bill, stated that "it is
grossly unjust for a criminal to profit from criminality and leave
the victim uncompensated" and that the "underlying premise of the
original Son of Sam bill is as valid today as it was at the time the
Supp. 1992); MNN. STAT. ANN. § 611A.68 (West 1987 & Supp. 1992); MISS. CODE
ANN. §§ 99-38-1 to -11 (Supp. 1992); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 595.045(14) (Vernon Supp.
1992); MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-9-104(1)(d) (1991); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 81-1836 to -
1842 (1987 & Supp. 1990); NEV. R V. STAT. § 217.265 (1986); NJ. STAT. ANN. §§
52:4B-26 to -30 (West 1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-22-22 (Michie 1990); OHio REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 2969.01-.06 (Anderson Supp. 1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 17
(1992); OP. REV. STAT. § 147.275 (1991); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 180-7.18 (1990); R.I.
GEN. LAWS §§ 12-25.1-1 to -12 (Supp. 1991); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-59-40 to -80 (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1992); S.D. CODnmD LAWS ANN. § 23A-28A-1 (1988); TENN. CODE ANN.
§§ 29-13-201 to -208 (1980); TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8309-1, §§ 1-18 (Vernon
Supp. 1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-11-12.5 (1992); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§
7.68.200-.280 (West 1992); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 949.165(2) (West Supp. 1991); WYO.
STAT. § 1-40-112(d) (1992).
3. 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991).
4. Act of July 24, 1992, ch. 618, §§ 1-17, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1618-23. The various
sections of the new law amend parts of the New York Executive Law, Civil Practice Law
and Rules, Criminal Procedure Law, and Penal Law. The central provision is § 10 of the
Act, which repeals the old and adds a new Executive Law § 632-a.
5. Id § 1, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1618, 1618 (to be codified at N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R.
§ 213-b).
6. Id § 8, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1618, 1619-20 (to be codified at N.Y. CIUM. PROC. LAW
§ 420.10(6)(a)).
7. Id § 12, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1618, 1622 (to be codified at N.Y. PENAL LAW §
60.27(1)).
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[original] law was enacted."' State Senator Emanuel R. Gold, the
primary sponsor of the revised law, noted that "[the new law]
attempts to recapture for crime victims much of what was intended
for them under the [previous] 'Son of Sam' Law."9
However, the question remains whether this new law-whose
underlying premise is considered valid by a governor and many of
his constituents who are fed up with high crime rates-will be
effective in aiding crime victims in their attempts to receive
monetary damages from convicts. It seems rather disingenuous for
politicians like Senator Gold to pass a "new" "Son of Sam" law
intended to "recapture" what was intended by the old law because
it cannot be said that the old law-poorly drafted and infrequently
used-was resoundingly successful in its goal of prohibiting
convicts from profiting as a result of their crime.' ° Yet, with its
weaknesses, the old law nevertheless made for sound public policy.
The fundamental notion that one should not profit from his crime
8. See Gary Spencer, Revised 'Son-of-Sam' Law Signed by Governor Cuomo, N.Y.
U., Aug. 14, 1992, at 1.
9. See Memorandum of Senator Emanuel R. Gold describing the provisions,
justification, and fiscal implications of the new "Son of Sane' law, at 2 (undated)
(available from the Senator's Albany office) [hereinafter Sen. Gold Memo].
10. The old law was only invoked to escrow monies in six cases. See Meg Cox,
'Son of Sam' Statute to Get Supreme Test, WALL ST. J., Oct. 8, 1991, at B1. The
following lists the criminal, the crime and the funds escrowed as of August 31, 1991:
Criminal Crime Amount Source
Jack Henry Abbott Murder $16,646.99 Movie, book,
play options
Mark Chapman Murder 8,924.14 People Magazine
interview
Henry Hill Accessory to 1,200.00 TV interview
murder, arson,
robbery
Michele Sindona Bank fraud 14,660.51 Book
. Foster Winans Securities 20,519.98 Book
fraud
Sohn Wojtowicz Bank robbery 16,340A6 Movie (Dog Day
Afternoon)
19921
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is still backed by the crime-weary public and there is a strong state
interest in achieving this goal-a point admitted by the Simon &
Schuster Court." Since the Court did not rule that all such victim
restitution statutes are per se unconstitutional, 12 New York could
have enacted a new law that would have involved the state more
in ensuring that criminals' ill-begotten assets did not reach their
hands. However, the New York legislature did not do so.
This article will consider the new law-its effectiveness and its
constitutionality-and address the question of whether New York
lawmakers shirked their public responsibilities in ducking state
involvement in the new statutory scheme. This article will
conclude by proposing a model statute that would more effectively
aid in the compensation of crime victims and that would still pass
constitutional scrutiny under Simon & Schuster.
I. THE OLD "SON OF SAM" LAW
Given all that has been written about the birth, life and death
of the original law,'3 only a short summary of the events leading
to the high court's nullification are in order. Section 632-a of the
Executive Law was first enacted as a response to the sale of the
"Son of Sam" serial killer David Berkowitz's story of his crimes.
The public's fascination with individuals like Berkowitz led
publisher McGraw-Hill to buy the rights to Berkowitz's story in a
deal that included a $250,000 advance, $150,000 profit to the ghost
writer, and $75,000 to Berkowitz to be paid through his court-ap-
11. 112 S. Ct. at 510.
12. Id at 512.
13. See Mark A. Conrad, The Demise of New York's "Son of Sam" Law, N.Y.S. BAR
I., Mar.-Apr. 1992, at 28; Jeanne E. Dugan, Comment, Crime Doesn't Pay-or Does it?:
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Fischetti, 65 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 981 (1991); Karen M. Ecker
& Margot J. O'Brien, Note, Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Fischetti: Can New York's Son
of Sam Law Survive First Amendment Challenge?, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1075 (1991);
Ralph W. Johnson, Ifl, Conunent, Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York
Crime Victims Board. The Demise of New York's Son of Sam Law and the Decision that
Could Have Been, 2 FORDHiAM ENT., MEDjA & hiNE. PROP. L.F. 193 (1992); Nicholas
C. Katsoris, The Supreme Court Frees "Son of Sam," ENT. & SPORTS LAW., Winter 1992,
at 14.
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pointed conservator.' 4 The resulting public outrage of an admitted
killer15 profiting from his crimes turned the notion that "crime
does not pay" on its head and resulted in the passage of section
632-a. Indeed, Berkowitz's critme-related income was ultimately
distributed to his victims' families. 16
Responding to the public's anger, the New York legislature
drafted a bill intended to give crime victims considerable power to
collect against the perpetrators of the crimes against them-at least
in theory. In language frequently quoted by the various courts and
in other forums, Senator Emanuel R. Gold, the sponsor of the
original bill stated:
It is abhorrent to one's sense of justice and decency that an
individual, such as [Berkowitz], can expect to receive large
sums of money for his story once he is captured-while
five people are dead, other people were injured as a result
of his conduct. This bill would make it clear that in all
criminal situations, the victim must be more important than
the criminal.' 7
The original law, broad in its scope, required publishers and
broadcasters to submit contracts and turn over monies resulting
from works dealing with the "reenactment of such crime, by way
of a movie, book, magazine article, tape recording, phonograph
record, radio or television presentation, live entertainment of any
kind, or from the expression of such accused or convicted person's
thoughts, feelings, opinions or emotions regarding such crime" to
the state Crime Victims Board for payment to victims of the
14. See Brief for Respondents at 8, Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. 501 (No. 90-1059).
15. Berkowitz was an admitted, but not a convicted, killer since he was adjudged not
guilty by reason of insanity.
16. In 1987, a court settled the final accounting of $118,433.36 resulting from
Berkowitz's share of royalties and fees from interviews and the money was distributed
to twelve of his victims and their estates. Cerisse Anderson, $118,000 'Son of Sam'
Royalties Shared by 12 Victims or Estates, N.Y. W., Sept 2, 1987, at 1; see also In re
Johnsen, id, at 15 (Doris Johnsen was Berkowitz's court-appointed conservator).
17. Memorandum of Senator Emanuel . Gold, 1977 N.Y. State Legis. Ann. 267
(cited in Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 724
F. Supp. 170, 174 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)).
1992]
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crime. IS
The original law diverted the profits of both convicted criminals
and individuals merely accused of a crime if they were eventually
convicted. It defined "victim" as one who suffers "personal,
physical, mental or emotional injury, or pecuniary loss as a direct
result of the crime." 19 A convict included "any person convicted
of a crime... and any person who has voluntarily and intelligently
admitted the commission of a crime for which such person is not
prosecuted." 20
The Crime Victims Board reviewed submitted publishing and
broadcast contracts to determine whether the work proposed by
them discussed a crime or contained an admission to a crime. If
the Board found the proposed work in violation of the statute, it
was empowered to deposit the monies payable under the contracts
in an escrow account for the benefit of victims of the particular
crime described or for those victims' representatives. If, within
five years of the establishment of the account, a victim brought a
civil action against his attacker and obtained a money judgment,
the victim could have satisfied his judgment against the account."'
Even though the statute applied with equal force to individuals
merely accused of a crime, it did require the Board to pay back all
monies in escrow in the event that a defendant was acquitted2 or
in the event no one "victim" claimed the money within five years
after the establishment of the escrow account.23
In the case of a defendant deemed not guilty by reason of
mental disease or defect or found unfit to proceed to trial as a
result of such a condition, the Board still could consider that person
a convict subject to seizure of assets.24 The old law did permit
18. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(1) (McKinney 1982).
19. L § 632-a(10)(a).
20. Id. § 632-a(10)(b).
21. Id. § 632-a(l).
22. Id- § 632-a(3).
23. Id § 632-a(4).
24. Id §§ 632-a(5), 632-a(6). Section 632-a(6) permitted the board to bring an
interpleader action to determine disposition of the escrow account if the accused was unfit
to stand trial as a result of mental disease or defect.
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payments from the escrow account to the accused or convicted for
legal representation during any stage of the criminal proceedings
(including appeals) up to one-fifth of the total monies escrowed.'
Although rarely invoked during its fourteen year existence, the
law was used in some celebrated cases. Jean Harris, the convicted
murderer of her lover Dr. Herman Tarnower, had royalties attached
for her book, A Stranger in Two Worlds, because certain portions
dealt with the crime 6 Mark David Chapman, the killer of ex-
Beatle John Lennon had $8,924 seized that was paid to him for his
cooperation in a People Magazine interview,27 and Jack Henry
Abbott, a career criminal and talented writer, who killed a young
waiter shortly after his release from prison and then wrote about
the crime, had $16,646 escrowed.
The law's encompassing nature-especially its broad definition
of convict and its regulation of expression of such persons-made
section 632-a ripe for constitutional challenge as violative of first
amendment rights of convicts, publishers, and broadcasters. Simon
& Schuster, the publisher of Wiseguy: Life in a Mafia Family, an
autobiographical recollection of a small-time gangster named Henry
Hill, became the successful challenger.
Hill, who was known in Mafia parlance as a "wiseguy," became
a government witness after his capture, and spent hundreds of
hours with author Nicholas Pileggi, to whom he provided specific
details about his exploits. These were often lurid accounts describ-
ing bribery, assault, extortion, theft, burglary, arson, drug dealing,
credit card fraud, and murder?9  His story received favorable
reviews."° Some of his admitted crimes were spectacular and
well-reported; the Boston College point-shaving scandal and the
25. Id. § 632-a(8).
26. See Children of Bedford, Inc. v. Petromelis, 573 N.E.2d 541 (N.Y. 1991),
vacated, 112 S. Ct. 859 (1992).
27. See supra note 10.
28. See supra note 10.
29. See NICHOLAS PILEGGI, WISEGUY: LIFE IN A MAFIA PAMILY (1985); see also
Simon & Schuster, 724 F. Supp. at 172-73.
30. For a sampling of reviews of the book, see Brief for Petitioner at 8-9, Simon &
Schuster, 112 S. Ct. 501 (No. 90-1059); see also Johnson, supra note 13, at 202-06.
1992]
34 FORDHAM ENT., MEDIA & INTELL. PROP. L.F.
theft of $6 million from the Lufthansa Airline terminal at Kennedy
Airport were among the most prominent.31 The successful book
provided the basis for the hit motion picture Goodfellas.
Hill served jail time and then received immunity and a new
identity under the Federal Witness Protection Program in exchange
for testifying against other organized crime members.3 2  The
book's success caught the attention of the Crime Victims Board
which concluded that the book was "subject to the regulations
promulgated in section 632-a, because the book contained Hill's
thoughts, feelings, opinions and emotions about and admissions to
his participation in criminal activities. ' 33 The Board then ordered
Simon & Schuster to suspend payments, including any future
royalties, to Hill's literary agent and ordered Hill to turn over
$96,250 in payments already made to him.34
Simon & Schuster brought a federal action under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 against the Crime Victims Board, claiming that the law
violated the publisher's first and fourteenth amendment rights. It
alleged that the statute had a chilling effect on speech by making
it highly unlikely that any convict would relate his or her exploits
to the general public.35
Both the district court3 6 and Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit37 upheld the law, but each on strikingly different grounds
based on differing constitutional theory. Although Wiseguy was
clearly classified as speech protected by the First Amendment, the
respective courts had conflicting philosophies as to whether the law
"incidentally" or "directly" affected that speech. The distinction is
31. See, e.g., Dan Lauck & Joe Pichirallo, Point Shaving is Alleged at Boston
College, WASH. POST, Jan. 16, 1981, at Al; Joseph P. Fried, Federal Investigators
Seeking to Solve the Largest Cash Robbery in the Nation's History, N.Y. TIMES, June 15,
1980, at Al.
32. Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 506.
33. Simon & Schuster, 724 F. Supp. at 172.
34. Ia at 173.
35. a
36. Ia at 173-80.
37. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Fischetti, 916 F.2d 777, 781-84 (2d Cir. 1990), rev'd
sub nom. Simon & Schuster, Inc. y. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 112
S. Ct. 501 (1991).
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important in terms of first amendment jurisprudence. If the
regulation is "incidental" to speech, a less onerous standard of
review is employed than if the regulation "directly" relates to
speech, rendering it "content-based.' A state law that incidentally
restricts speech is constitutional when the state interest for which
it restricted the speech is "substantial" and does not impose
sanctions greater than essential to that governmental interest.38 A
state law that directly restricts speech is only constitutional if the
state interest for which it restricted the speech is "compelling," and
if the law is "narrowly drawn to achieve that end." 9
The lower court in Simon & Schuster opined that although
section 632-a "act[ed] as a procedural hurdle in the publishing
process," 40 it did not prohibit speech; rather, it interrupted the
"profit-making aspect' of the speech.4' Finding, therefore, that
section 632-a did not directly affect expressive activity, the court
applied the less intrusive O'Brien test and concluded that the law
furthered a substantial governmental interest and was not more
restrictive than was essential to further the state's goals.42
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in a 2-1 decision,
upheld the lower court but differed in its reasoning.43 The panel
concluded that the statute directly impacted speech, necessitating
the need for "strict scrutiny" review." The majority held that the
statute passed the test, stating that the law served a compelling
state interest "narrowly tailored" to the state's interest in denying
38. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367,376-77 (1968). Technically, the standard
has four components: (1) the governmental regulation must be "within the constitutional
power of the Governmenf'; (2) the regulation must "furtherD an important or substantial
Governmental interest;" (3) "the Governmental interest [must be] unrelated to the
suppression of free expression"; and (4) "the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than essential to the furtherance of that interest."
However, many courts apply only the two most important prongs of the test: substantial
governmental interest and narrow limitations. See Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. Federal
Communications Comm'n, 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
39. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37,45 (1983).
40. 724 F. Supp. at 176.
41. Id. at 177.
42. Id. at 179.
43. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Fischetti, 916 F.2d 777, 778 (2d Cir. 1990).
44. Id at 781-82.
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"criminals any gain from the stories of their crimes" until their
victims had been fully compensated. 45 However, Judge Jon 0.
Newman, in his dissenting opinion, concluded that the statute did
not pass the test. He wrote that the statute was both underinclu-
sive-and a burden to publishers when victims could use state
attachment laws to obtain criminals' assets-and overinclusive
because it applied equally to books written by those accused of a
crime, not just those convicted. He therefore found the statute an
unjustifiable "content-based" restriction on speech.4 6
The Supreme Court's unanimous decision47 echoed some of
the concerns of Judge Newman's dissenting opinion. Writing for
the Court, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor stated outright that the law
was "content-based" and "impose[d] a financial burden on speakers
because of the content of their speech."48  Such laws served
effectively to drive certain speech from the marketplace of ideas.49
The Court rejected New York's attempt to distinguish section 632-a
from a recent case rejecting a magazine tax by the state of Arkan-
sas, holding that the issue in both cases was the same: financial
burdens operating as disincentives to speak.5"
The Court found that New York did have a "compelling state
interest" in protecting crime victims by ensuring that they obtain
compensation from those who harm them and in preventing the
wrongdoers from dissipating their assets before the victims can
recover.5 1 As examples, it cited provisions for prejudgment
remedies and restitution orders that also achieve that goal.52
Additionally, the Court agreed that, as a fundamental principle,
45. Id. at 783.
46. Id. at 786-87 (Newman, J, dissenting).
47. Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. 501. The vote was 8-0; Justice Thomas was not
yet sitting on the Court when the case was argued. Id. at 512.
48. Id at 508 (citing Leathers v. Medlock, 111 S. Ct. 1438, 1443-44 (1991)). The
Court emphatically reiterated this legal truism, stating it was so "obvious" as to not
require explanation. Id
49. Id. at 508 (citing Leathers, 111 S. Ct. at 1444).
50. Id. (citing Arkansas Writers' Project. Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987)).
51. Id at 509.
52. Id at 509-10 (citing N.Y. CIv. PiAc. L. & R. § 6201-6226 (McKinney 1980
& Supp. 1991); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 60.27 (McKinney 1987)).
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New York has a compelling interest in preventing criminals from
profiting from their crimes 3 However, the Court chastised the
New York for the definition it gave of its interest: to "ensur[e]
that criminals do not profit from storytelling about their crimes
before their victims have a meaningful opportunity to be compen-
sated for their injuries.:" 4
This constricted definition caused a great many problems for
the Court and undermined the statute's legal viability. Justice
O'Connor wrote that the state could not rationally articulate why
it should have any greater interest in compensating victims from
"proceeds of the crime" than from any of the criminals' other
assets.5' Nor could it justify the distinction between this form of
expression and others in connection with its stated interest of
"transferring the fruits of crime from criminals to their victims."
56
The Court then found the statute to be an unlawful, content-bas-
ed restriction due to its significant overinclusiveness; the statute
thus failed the strict scrutiny test? Its broad definition of
"person convicted of a crime!' enabled the Board to escrow the
income of any author who admitted to having committed a crime,
whether or not the author was actually accused or convicted.
Justice O'Connor pointed out that such a broad wording could have
escrowed fees from many literary works, giving as examples The
Autobiography of Malcolm X (which describes crimes committed
53. See Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188, 190 (N.Y. 1889).
54. 112 S. Ct. at 510 (quoting Brief for Respondents at 46, Simon & Schuster, 112
S. Ct. 501 (No. 90-1059)).
55. Id
56. Id
57. Id The Court added, "because the Son of Sam law is so overinclusive, we need
not address the Board's contention that the statute is content neutral... ." Id at 511
n.** (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989); Renton v. Playtime
Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986)). In those cases, the Court determined that the statutes
in question were content neutral since they were intended to serve purposes unrelated to
the speech, despite incidental effects on some speakers; noting that the regulations were
"narrowly tailored," even under the less exacting tailoring standards that had been applied
in Ward and Renton (see discussion of the O'Brien standard supra note 38 and
accompanying text), the footnote stated that in this case the speech limitations were more
directly related to the speech and that the broadness of the definitions could hardly be
considered "narrowly tailored." Id at 511-12 n.**.
1992]
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before the author became a major civil rights figure), Henry David
Thoreau's Civil Disobedience (where the author acknowledged his
refusal to pay taxes) and the Confessions of St. Augustine (wherein
the author admits that he stole pears from a neighboring vine-
yard). 58
The Court found it unnecessary to reach the issue of whether
the statute was underinclusive, as well as overinclusive.59 In a
footnote, Justice O'Connor reasoned that the law was so
un-narrowly tailored as to make this argument specious.60 In a
separate concurrence, Justice Kennedy criticized the majority's
reliance on the "compelling state interest" standard as an inapplica-
ble standard to use in "speech" cases.
6
'
While the decision did not address the constitutionality of the
many other "Son of Sam" laws across the country, a number of
states had laws virtually identical to the invalidated New York
law,62 and many of these states introduced amended laws to
comply with the Court's mandate.63
I0. NEw YORK'S REVISED SON OF SAM LAW
Reaction to the Court's decision was predictable. State officials
were "disappointed"; victims and their families were "outraged"; 64
58. Iad at 511. Other authors potentially affected included Emma Goldman, Martin
Luther King, Jr., Jesse Jackson, and Bertrand Russell (who was jailed for seven days at
the age of 89 for participating in a sit-down protest against nuclear weapons). Id.
59. Id. at 511-12 n.**; cf. 112 S. Ct. at 512 (Blackmun, I., concurring).
60. Id. at 511-12 n.**.
61. Id. at 512-15 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
62. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 9101-9106 (1987 & Supp. 1990); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 595.045(14) (Vernon Supp. 1991) (available in Vernon Supp. 1992); N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 52:4B-26 to -30 (West 1986); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2969.01-.06 (Anderson
Supp. 1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 17 (1991) (available in 1992); OR. REV. CODE
ANN. § 147.275 (1991); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 180-7.18 (1990).
63. See, e.g., Assembly Bill No. 373, 205th NJ. Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (1992)
(amending N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:4B-26 to -30), available in LEXIS, Legis Library,
Sttext File.
64. See Deborah Pines, Son of Sam Law Ruled Unconstitutional, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 11,
1991, at I (describing reaction of Howard Zwickel, Chief of the New York State Attorney
General's Litigation Bureau, who argued Simon & Schuster for New York State, and
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and media and.publishing organizations were supportive.65 After
the initial reactions to the decision, the question was raised whether
the state should enact a revised Son of Sam law to fit the parame-
ters of the Court's Simon & Schuster opinion.
Governor Mario Cuomo went on record stating that New York
should enact a revised law.66 First amendment lawyers admitted
that, while the Supreme Court decision would make it difficult to
enact a "constitutional" law, it was not impossible to do so. 67
More recent first amendment rulings have confirmed the difficulty
of content-based restrictions on speech passing constitutional
muster.
68
The new statute was introduced in March 1992 by Senator
Emanuel R. Gold, the sponsor of the original law, along with a
number of co-sponsors.69 It was passed by both houses of the
New York State legislature and signed into law by the Governor on
July 24, 1992.70
The new law may be thought of as composed of two parts.
First, there is a totally revised Executive Law section 632-a to
replace the old law ruled unconstitutional.71 Second, there is a
including statements of Henry Howard, father-in-law of Richard Adan, who was stabbed
to death by convicted felon and author Jack Henry Abbott); see also Paul M. Barrett,
High Court Rejects 'Son of Sam' Law, Citing Criminals' Rights of Free Speech, WALL
ST. 1, Dec. 11, 1991, at A4 (quoting Charles Brown, a lawyer for victims rights groups).
65. See Meg Cox, 'Sam' Ruling Likely to Spark Media Scramble, WALL ST. J., Dec.
11, 1991, at Bi.
66. See Daniel Wise, Passage of New Son of Sam Law Seen Unlikely, N.Y. LJ., Dec.
12, 1991, at 1.
67. Id. at 2 (quoting Ronald S. Rauchberg, attorney for petitioner: "the fatal flaw
of in the [original] Son of Sam legislation can easily be remedied"); see also Paul 3.
Sleven, 'Son of Sam' Laws Following High Court's 'Simon & Schuster' Ruling, N.Y.
LJ., Dec. 27, 1991, at 1 (author suggests that Justice O'Connor's opinion may not require
a "drastic rethinldng" of the approach embodied in Executive Law section 632-a).
68. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992) (striking down an
ordinance that made illegal certain forms of "hate speech").
69. See S. 21017/A. 10915-B, 215th General Assembly, 2d Sess. (1992) (enacted as
Act of July 24, 1992, ch. 618, §§ 1-17, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1618-23).
70. See Gary Spencer, Revised "Son-of-Sam" Law Signed by Governor Cuomo, N.Y.
L.J, Aug. 14, 1992, at 1.
71. Act of July 24, 1992, ch. 618, § 10, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1618, 1620-21 (to be
codified at N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a).
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series of amendments to various sections of the state's Civil
Practice Law and Rules (CPLR) and Criminal Procedure Law
(CPL) that extend the statute of limitations for private rights of
action, redefine "profits from a crime," and discuss the mechanics
of obtaining restitution from a convicted criminal.72 With limited
exceptions, the law does not directly involve any state authority,
such as the Crime Victims Board (the agency that oversaw the
prior Son of Sam law), and it puts more of the burden on individu-
als suing to collect damages-akin to judgment-debtors.
The revised legislation also adds a new section to the CPLR
permitting a crime victim or his representative to bring an action
"to recover damages from a defendant convicted of a crime which
is the subject of [the] action, for any [resulting] injury or loss...
within seven years of the date of the crime,"73 or three years after
the discovery of profits from that crime.74
The seven-year limitations period was the subject of some
contention, since it was changed from a previously proposed term
of ten years 5 Even with the shorter seven-year term, it can be
assumed that the victim will have plenty of time to commence an
action against a defendant convict. Also, the CPLR's tolling
provisions would apply in the event that the victim leaves the state
and is not subject to in personam jurisdiction.7 6
72. See id. §§ 1-5, 17, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1618, 1618-19, 1623.
73. Id. § 1, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1618, 1618 (to be codified at N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & P,
§ 213-b).
74. Idl § 10, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1618, 1621 (to be codified at N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-
a(3)).
75. Compare Act of July 24, 1992, ch. 618, §§ 1-17, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1618-23 with
A. 7517/A. 10915, 215th General Assembly, 2d Sess. (1992) (unenacted earlier bill).
76. In New York, even people classified as "infants" or "insane" are qualified to toll
the statute of limitations. See N.Y. Crv. PRAc. L. & R. § 208 (McKinney 1990). An
infant is one who has not yet attained 18 years of age. Id. § 1050). Although the CPLR
does not define insanity, courts look to whether an individual is "capable of managing his
general business and social affairs." See McCarthy v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 435
N.E.2d 1072, 1074 (N.Y. 1982). The tolling period for a person "disabled" because of
infancy or insanity is up to three years after the disability ceases or the disabled dies, if
the limitations period on the underlying cause of action is three years or more. N.Y. CIv.
PRAC. L. & R. § 208. An automatic 18 month extension is added to the statutory period
on the death of the person against whom a cause of action exists. See generally id. §
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The alternative limitations proposal, a three year period after
discovery of the profit, is also intended to protect the victim of a
crime from a situation where the victim has no knowledge of
profits or where the convict obtains profits from the crime after the
seven year limitations period expires.?7 The section specifically
deals with the situation where the seven year period has expired.
It gives crime victims the opportunity to bring an action three years
after discovery or three years after actual notice is received by the
state Crime Victims Board, whichever is later?8 The Board is
required to "take such actions as are necessary" to give notice to
"all other known victims of the crime" by mailing or publishing a
notice once every six months for three years from initial notifica-
tion by a victim.' The new statute also authorizes the Board,
acting on behalf of crime victims, to seek provisional remedies
such as attachment in order to ensure that any judgment issued
under the law could be satisfied.80
As previously noted, the new legislation amends certain
provisions of the CPL as well. It requires that victims be informed
of the right to seek restitution and reparation; it also mandates that
pre-sentencing reports state the economic and actual out-of-pocket
losses to the victim and the amount of reparation sought by the
victim." Further, no convict may have his probation sentence
terminated unless he has made a good faith effort to comply with
an order of restitution or reparation.82 Bail fees may be applied
to payment of the restitution or reparation before payment of the
fine is credited. 3 If resentencing occurs with respect to any
210(b).
77. Act of July 24, 1992, ch. 618, § 10, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1618, 1620-21 (to be
codified at N.Y. EXEc. LAW § 632-a(3)).
78. Id.
79. Id., 1992 N.Y. Laws 1618. 1621 (to be codified at N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 632-a(S)).
80. Id. (to be codified at N.Y. Ex c. LAW § 632-a(6)).
81. Id. §8 3-4, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1618, 1618-19 (to be codified at N.Y. CRIM. PROC.
LAW §§ 390.30(3)(b)-390.30(4)).
82. Id. § 5, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1618, 1619 (to be codified at N.Y. CRim. PRoc. LAW
§ 410.90(3)(a)).
83. Id. § 6, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1618, 1619 (to be codified at N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW
§ 420.10(1)(e)).
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condition relating to restitution or reparation, the court must state
the reasons for the changes on the record. 4
The law also amends the CPL to permit the docketing of a
restitution order imposed by the court if the defendant fails to pay
any court-ordered restitution. Such a court order will be considered
a first lien upon all real property in which the defendant thereafter
acquired an interest. The lien has preference over all other liens,
security interests, and encumbrances (except a lien or interest for
the benefit of the government or a purchase money interest in any
property).85 If the sentencing report remits any or all of the
restitution or reparation, it must provide all affected parties with
the notice to give them the opportunity to be heard.8 6
One of the major changes in the new law is definitional. The
revised section 632-a(l) redefines the salient terms of the statute.
"Crime" is defined as "any felony defined in the penal law or any
other chapter of the consolidated laws of the state."87 This is a
significant limitation over the prior law's application to persons
accused or convicted of a crime in the state.8 8 The prior defini-
tion was an open-ended clause that included not only felonies, but
also misdemeanors and situations where the defendant was merely
accused of committing a crime. Presumably, this limitation was
drafted to avoid the problems of overbreadth that the Court referred
to in voiding the earlier statute. 9
The term "profits from the crime" is now defined as:
(i) any property obtained through or income generated from
the commission of a crime of which the defendant was
convicted; (ii) any property obtained by or income generat-
84. Id. § 7, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1618, 1619 (to be codified at N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW
§ 420.10(5)).
85. Id § 8, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1618, 1619-20 (to be codified at N.Y. CRIM. PROC.
LAW § 420.10(6)(a)).
86. Id. § 9, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1618, 1620 (to be codified at N.Y. CRlM. PROC. LAW
§ 420.30(2)).
87. Id § 10, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1618, 1620 (to be codified at N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 632-
a(1)(a)).
88. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(1) (McKinney 1982).
89. See Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 511.
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ed from the sale, conversion or exchange of proceeds of a
crime, including any gain realized by such sale, conversion
or exchange; and (iii) any property which the defendant
obtained or income generated as a result of having commit-
ted the crime, including any assets obtained through the use
of unique knowledge obtained during the commission of, or
in preparation for the commission of, the crime, as well as
any property obtained by or income generated from the
sale, conversion or exchange of such property and any gain
realized by such sale, conversion or exchange. 90
The old law did not specifically define this concept, except to
include monies from the reenactment of the crime by way of
reproduction in certain media and to include monies earned from
the sale of the criminal's thoughts, feelings, opinions or emotions
regarding the crime.' The revised statute's standard of property
not possessed "but for" commission of the crime, is borrowed from
New York asset forfeiture statute. 2
The new law logically denotes a "crime victim" to be the
victim of the offense or his representative. 93 The old law's
definition was similar, but not quite as specific. It stated that the
victim was one who "suffers personal, physical, mental or emotion-
al injury, or pecuniary loss as a direct result of the crime." 94
While essentially the same, the old law could have included one
directly affected by a misdemeanor offense or a situation where A,
B, and C were "victimized" by the defendant's actions, but the
defendant was only charged for crimes against A.
The new statute creates a role for the state's Crime Victims
Board, but it is a limited one. The law requires that every person
or legal entity (e.g. corporation, partnership, or association) which
knowingly contracts for or pays any "profit from the crime" must
90. See Act of July 24, 1992, ch. 618, § 10, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1618, 1620 (to be
codified at N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(l)(b)).
91. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(!) (McKinney 1982).
92. See N.Y. Cw. PRAc. L. & R. § 1310(2) (McKinney Supp. 1992).
93. Act of July 24, 1992, ch. 618, § 10, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1618, 1620 (to be codified
at N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(1)(c)).
94. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(1O) (McKinney 1982).
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give written notice to the Board as soon as practicable after
discovering that the payment is crime-related. Upon receipt, the
Board is required to notify other known victims of the crime of the
existence of such profits at their last known addresses and to
publish a legal notice once every six months for three years, in a
newspaper of general circulation in the county where the crime was
committed and in counties contiguous to it.95 This requirement
is intended to facilitate other civil actions against those monies and
to permit the three-year statute of limitations to run in the event the
seven-year period has expired. The old law stated essentially
the same legal notice requirements (except that it contained a five-
year publication period), but it did not require any direct notice to
the victims.97
Borrowing from the concept of an expanded reading of the
statute of limitations, the law gives the victims or their legal
representatives the right to bring civil actions for damages either
during the seven-year statute of limitations period' or within
three years of discovery.99 The three-year discovery period does
limit damages, however, to the value of the profits of the
crime.100
The old law did not mention private rights of action, since it
was the Crime Victims Board that escrowed the monies directly
from the publishers of criminals' works. The revised statute
requires a victim to give notice to the Board when commencing
such an action by delivering the summons and complaint, so that
the Board may give notice to other victims of the crime.'0 '
Where the Board itself takes action on behalf of crime victims,
95. Act of July 24, 1992, ch. 618, § 10, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1618, 1620-21 (to be
codified at N.Y. Exac. LAW § 632-a(5)).
96. Sen. Gold Memo, supra note 9, at 2-3.
97. See N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 632-a(2) (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1992).
98. Act of July 24, 1992, ch. 618, § 1, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1618 (to be codified at N.Y.
CIV. PRAC. L. & R. § 213-b).
99. Id. at § 10, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1618, 1621 (to be codified at N.Y. ExEc. LAW §
632-a(3)).
100. Id
101. Id, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1618, 1621 (to be codified at N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-
a(4)).
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the new law also permits it to apply for provisional remedies, such
as attachment, injunction, receivership and notice of pendency-all
available under the CPLR. 2
Also included in the law are provisions amending the Penal
Law to give sentencing courts discretion to require restitution or
reparation to crime victims and to require restitution as part of the
sentence imposed on the convict."0 Also, district attorneys may
advise courts, on or before sentencing, that victims seek restitution
or reparation and may advise as to the amount sought. In that
situation, or if a victim impact statement reports that a victim seeks
restitution or reparation, the court will be required to rule that
defendant make restitution of the fruits of the offense and repara-
tions for the actual out-of-pocket loss caused to the victim.104 If
the court declines to order reparation or restitution, it must state its
reasons for the record.'0 5 Finally, the new statute amends the
penal law to raise the cap from $10,000 to $15,000 for restitution
ordered upon conviction of a felony and from $5,000 to $10,000
for restitution ordered upon conviction of any other offense.0 6
11U. CIVmL LIBERTIS OBECTIONS
Even with its far narrower scope, the new law has come under
attack by certain civil liberties groups as constitutionally defective.
In a recent memorandum, the New York Civil Liberties Union
(NYCLU) focused on the issue of whether income generated "as a
result of having committed [a] crime, including any assets or
income obtained through the use of unique knowledge obtained
during the commission of... the crim&' may constitute "profits
from the crime."'0 7 This issue was not addressed by the Supreme
102. Id, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1618, 1621 (to be codified at N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 632-
a(6)(a)).
103. Id at § 12, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1618, 1622 (to be codified at N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 60.27(1)).
104. Id
105. Id
106. Id at § 16, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1618, 1623 (to be codified at N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 60.27(5)(a)).
107. See NEW YORK CIVm LiBETEs UNIoN, 1992 LEGISLATE MAMORANDUM NO.
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Court in Simon & Schuster. Disputing that such in-
come-including, of course, book proceeds-may constitute profits
of crime, the NYCLU concluded that the new statute was constitu-
tionally infirm, as well.'0 8 The NYCLU also objected to the
notice requirement under which "any entity" that "contracts for,
pays, or agrees to pay, any profit from a crime.., to a person
charged with or convicted of [a] crime [must] give written notice
to the crime victims board."'0 )9
Although the Civil Liberties Union conceded that the govern-
ment has "broad power" to recover the proceeds or fruits of a
crime (giving the federal RICO statute"0 and New York's forfei-
ture statute"' as examples), it found fault with the effect of the
new Son of Sam law's definition of just what the "proceeds"
are."' The NYCLU noted that the new statute's definition is, in
fact, broader in scope than that used in New York's forfeiture
law," 3 and-to the extent that this definition could include
income received from writing a book-the Civil Liberties Union
objected to the definition." 4  It asserted that this "problematic"
approach "stretch[es] the meaning of [the] word ['proceeds']
beyond recognition."" 5
Offering what it considered an informative analogy, the
55A, at I [hereinafter NYCLU MEMO 55A] (citing S. 8937,215th General Assembly, 2d
Sess. (1992) (definition incorporated and enacted in Act of July 24, 1992, ch. 618, § 10,
1992 N.Y. Laws 1618, 1620 (to be codified at N.Y. ExEC. LAW § 632-a(1)(b)))).
108. Id
109. See id. (citing S. 8937, 215th General Assembly, 2d Sess. (1992) (requirement
incorporated and enacted in Act of July 24, 1992, ch. 618, § 10, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1618,
1621 (to be codified at N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(2)))).
110. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968
(1988 & West Supp. 1992).
111. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. §§ 1310-1352 (McKinney Supp. 1992).
112. NYCLU MEMO 55A, supra note 107, at 2.
113. Id (citing N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. § 1310). Section 1310(2) of the CPLR
defines "proceeds of a crime!' as any property obtained through the commission of a
felony crime" (emphasis added), whereas "profits from the crime" under New York's new
Son of Sam law are defined as "any property... obtained... as a result of having
committed the crime [or] through the use of unique knowledge obtained during the
commission of [it]." N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(l)(b).
114. NYCLU MEMO 55A, supra note 107, at 2.
115. kd
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NYCLU observed that books written by former presidents and
government officials dealing with their experiences in office have
been considered "separate, individual literary act[s]," rather than
acts directly related to their government service. 6 The point of
this somewhat tortured analogy was that the criminal-author's book,
according to the NYCLU, was not a proceed of the crime, but
rather a product of an "intervening creative and expressive
enterprise."'" 7 It added that there was nothing in the law that
would require labelling the employment income of a criminal who
obtained work (e.g. as a bus driver) after his crime as "proceeds
from the crime!'; the statute singled out literary works as subject to
this encumbrance."'
The Simon & Schuster Court elected not to address whether
"proceeds from the crime" may fairly include income from story-
telling about one's crimes." 9 The old law did not offer a defini-
tion of proceeds of a crime, but its first section implicitly defined
the term in its general concept of moneys received as a result of a
work depicting the commission of a crime. 2' Petitioner Simon
& Schuster briefed the issue, making arguments substantially
similar to those of the NYCLU."'2 While this issue seems ripe
for subsequent adjudication, the test case will probably not involve
the New York law.
It seems unavoidable that New York's new statute will pass
constitutional muster since the state activity authorized by it is
minimal and since the income received from a convict's speech is
not singled out. As noted earlier, the definition of "profits from
the crime" in the new statute encompasses all property obtained or
income generated from the commission of the crime." Further,
116. Id. (citing Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539
(1985) (finding unauthorized publication of portions of President Ford's memoirs not to
be fair use)).
117. Id. (emphasis in original).
118. Id at 2-3.
119. 112 S. Ct. at 510.
120. See N.Y. EXE LAW § 632-a(1) (McKinney 1982).
121. See Brief for Petitioner at 34-36, Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. 501 (No. 90-
1059).
122. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
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the new law is grounded in the well-established power of states to
compel forfeiture of illegally obtained assets." It is therefore all
the more likely that courts will grant considerable deference to the
will of New York's legislature as a valid exercise state power.
IV. APPROACHES OF OTHER STATES
Despite such arguments, there seems little doubt that the revised
law is considerably narrower in scope than the original statute
struck down by the Court. The key difference is the far more
limited-and less intrusive-role of the Crime Victims Board and
the far greater responsibility given to victims or their representa-
tives to institute private causes of action to recover for their
injuries. The new statute also creates a presumption favoring
restitution and reparation as a disposition of criminal cases; the
sponsors of the statute hope that it will expand the opportunities for
crime victims to be compensated by the person responsible for
victimizing them."2
It is difficult to determine at this time whether the new law will
be successful-only time will tell. One wonders though if the New
York legislature could have enacted a statute that would have
involved the state more actively in protecting the rights of crime
victims by facilitating monetary compensation. The Simon &
Schuster Court did not rule that all victim compensation laws were
per se unconstitutional. Implicitly, therefore, the laws of certain
other states that permit seizure of criminal assets may withstand
constitutional scrutiny.1 5  The Court focused on the fact that
New York's statute was overbroad because it applied to works on
123. See Morganthau v. Citisource, Inc., 500 N.E.2d 850 (N.Y. 1986) (fact that
defendants had not yet been convicted of crimes for which they had been indicted did not
bar state from commencing forfeiture action pursuant to N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. §§ 1310-
1352); see also United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600 (1989) (pre-trial seizure of assets
under Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984,21 U.S.C. § 853 (1988), did not violate Due
Process Clause of Fifth Amendment); Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491
U.S. 617 (1989) (same).
124. See Sen. Gold Memo, supra note 9, at 2.
125. 112 S. Ct. at 512 ("We have no occasion to determine the constitutionality of
[other states'] laws.").
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any subject (provided that the author's thoughts or recollections
about his crime were expressed).'
In fact, it is interesting to compare the provisions of other
states' "Son of Sam" laws. A number of states, such as Pennsylva-
nia,127 New Jersey,2 llinoiS129 and Massachusetts,130 aped
the New York law to a great extent. Other states, however, have
passed laws that may be able to pass constitutional muster, even
though their laws involve the state more directly than does the
revised New York law.
Florida's law illustrates an approach that does not as blatantly
target income from literary works above other assets and that is
limited to reach only works regarding crimes of which an author
is convicted. Its criminal procedure law creates a state lien on
proceeds "from literary or other type[s] of account[s]" of the crime
of which the defendant was convicted.13' The lien automatically
attaches upon conviction but deals only with income generated
from the convict's accounts of crimes of which he was convict-
ed. 3 "Conviction" is defined as a guilty verdict or a guilty or
nolo contendere plea by the defendant; it does not include an
adjudication as not guilty by reason of insanity, nor does it include
admissions of other crimes that the convict may make in a literary
work.3  It will be recalled that the New York law was not so
limited, permitting the escrow of income of any author who
admitted in his work to having committed a crime, whether or not
he was ever convicted or even accused."M
The lien covers "royalties, commissions, proceeds of sale or
any other thing of value payable to or accruing to a convicted felon
or a person on his behalf, including any person to whom the
126. Id. at 511.
127. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 180-7.18 (1990).
128. NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:4B-26 to -30 (West 1986).
129. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 70, para. 411 (Smith-Hurd 1989).
130. MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 258A, § 8 (Law. Co-op. 1992).
131. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944512 (West Supp. 1992).
132. Id. § 944.512(1).
133. Id.
134. Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 511.
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proceeds may be transferred by gift from any literary, cinematic or
other account of the crime for which [the felon] was convict-
ed."' 35 The phrase "or other account of the crime" is somewhat
vague and certainly could be read to include monies from sources
other than literary works regarding a convict's crime. The statute
also creates a pecking order for claimants of the proceeds.
136
Arizona limits the reach of its law to individuals convicted of
a crime,13' and in its definition of "convicted" it includes
individuals found not guilty by reason of insanity.3 1 It takes an
contract-law-oriented approach, prohibiting any contract with an
accused with respect to reenactment of his crime by movie, book,
article or other media representation.'39 It justifies this approach
on public policy grounds. 40  Money will only be seized if a
defendant is convicted (or ruled not guilty by reason of insanity)
of the crime in question and if the victim brings an action for
losses arising from that crime within five years of the establishment
of the account. 41 If a defendant is not convicted, any seized
income is returned to him;4  if no suits are brought within five
years of the establishment of the account, any seized income is put
into the state general fund.
Other states have limited the reach of their Son of Sam laws in
a manner similar to Arizona. Iowa's law, for example, is limited
to reach only individuals convicted of a crime;'" the laws in
Ohio 45 and Nevada 146 are similarly limited. While it cannot
135. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.512(1) (West Supp. 1992).
136. Id. § 944.512(2). The Florida law mandates that 25 percent of the income
affected by the statute go to the dependents of the felon and that 25 percent go to the
victim of the crime and his dependents, to the extent of their damages as determined by
the court. The income left over is distributed as an outright award to the crime victim.
Id.
137. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4202(B) (1989).
138. Id § 13-4202(F).
139. Id. § 13-4202(A).
140. Id.
141. Id. § 134202(B).
142. Id. § 13-4202(D).
143. Id. § 13-4202(E).
144. IOWA CODE ANN. § 910.15 (West Supp. 1992).
145. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2969.01-.06 (Anderson Supp. 1991).
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be certain that the Arizona law would survive constitutional
scrutiny after Simon & Schuster, one would expect it to have a
better chance than the old New York law because it addresses itself
to the Court's overbreadth concerns by reaching only to income
generated by convicts' recollections of crimes of which they were
convicted and not to the income of persons merely accused of a
crime.
V. A REVISION THAT WOULD BETER SERVE CRvME VICTMvS
Because many states have yet to revise their Son of Sam laws,
it is worthwhile to consider what might be done to enact a
constitutional Son of Sam law that would provide for state seizure
of convicts' income from story-telling about their crimes. The
New York legislature did not attempt to do this, one suspects,
because it feared another legal challenge. However, this author
believes that a statute could be written that would permit direct
state involvement in asset seizure but that would not run afoul of
Simon & Schuster. Such a statute would be beneficial to the public
because it would streamline the process and put less of an onus on
crime victims.
The Court did not rule that income seizure under any Son of
Sam law would be unconstitutional. It specifically held that New
York had a compelling state interest for its law.'47 The New
York law was struck down because it was not narrowly tailored to
achieve its compelling state interest. 48 This is a substantial open
door.
To exploit the open door, lawmakers in states seeking to amend
their Son of Sam laws to pass muster under Simon & Schuster (and
146. Nay. REv. STAT. § 217.265 (1986).
147. Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 511. Justice Blackmun agreed in his
concurring opinion that New York had a compelling state interest for its law. Id. at 512
(Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy agreed that New York's law was
unconstitutional, but he asserted that compelling-state-interest analysis derives from the
Court's equal protection jurisprudence and that it does not belong in a straight first
amendment case. Id. at 512 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
148. Id at 512.
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this affects, at the very least, lawmakers in all states that copied the
New York law) should concentrate on either or both (depending on
the state) of two goals: (1) Narrowing the definition of "person
convicted of a crime," and (2) Tightening the fit between the end
of compensating crime victims and the means of confiscating
income derived from expressive activity. New York's law had
trouble in each of these areas.
VI. MEETING THESE GOALS WITH A PROPOSED MODEL STATUTE
Among the reasons for which the Simon & Schuster Court
criticized the overbreadth of the old New York law was that, by its
terms, the old section 632-a could reach the assets of individuals
who had not been convicted (or even accused) of the crimes about
which they wrote.149 The statute did this through its broad
definition of "person convicted of a crime," which could include a
person who had "voluntarily and intelligently admitted the commis-
sion of a crime for which such person [was] not prosecuted."' 50
To be assured of passing constitutional review, new statutes ought
only to reach the assets of convicted criminals; this would exclude,
as well, individuals found not guilty by reason of insanity. Where
the income derived by a convicted criminal from story-telling about
his crime can be reached by the victim of that crime, there is a
substantially closer fit between statutory ends and means.
The Court also faulted the old New York law for singling out
income derived from expressive activity for differential treatment
in a manner not narrowly tailored to meet the compelling state
interest that justified the differential treatment in the first in-
stance.'51  The ends/means fit can be remedied through the
definition of "profits from the crime" or by eliminating the
differential treatment-reaching all assets regardless of source. The
latter option would create overbreadth problems of its own. The
former option was selected by the New York legislature in revising
its Son of Sam law; the legislature, of course, defined "profits from
149. Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 511.
150. N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 632-a(10)(b) (McKinney 1982).
151. Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 510.
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the crime" outright and worded its definition so that it could
include expressive activity.152
Simon & Schuster did not find fault with New York's asset
seizure scheme, whereby the Crime Victims Board put income
from criminals' story-telling into an escrow account for the benefit
of crime victims. Nonetheless, the new law takes the Board out of
the business of escrowing income, permitting it only to attach
profits from the crime while victim-plaintiffs sue their attackers to
collect out of the attackers' crime-related profits. As noted, this
scheme is less desirable than one under which the state, through its
crime victims board, seizes and holds the assets itself.
Incorporating the changes required by Simon & Schuster and
avoiding changes not required by it, the following first subpart of
a model statute should not only pass constitutional muster but
would better serve the public:
1. Every person, firm, corporation, partnership, association
or other legal entity contracting with any person or the
representative or assignee of that person, convicted of a
crime in this state, with respect to its reenactment in a
motion picture, book, magazine article, audio tape record-
ing, phonograph, radio or television presentation, live
portrayal in an entertainment or dramatic context, or from
the expression of the convict's thoughts, feelings, opinions
or emotions regarding the particular crime of which he or
she was convicted, shall submit a copy of such contract to
this state's Crime Victims Board and pay over to the Board
any monies to which the convict would be entitled under
the contract if a victim of that particular crime reenacted in
any of the above media or expressed by the convict files a
"notice of claim" with the Board. The notice must be filed
within: (a) three years after conviction, or (b) one year of
the date the contract, or (c) three months of publication,
broadcast or release of the work depicting or reenacting the
thoughts, feelings, opinions or emotions of the convict
152. Act of July 24,1992, ch. 618, § 10, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1618, 1620 (to be codified
at N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(1)(b)).
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regarding the crime, whichever is latest. 53
Observe that only upon conviction of a criminal will his media
contract have to be filed with the state. Under this model subpart
one, it is still up to victims to file claims. This diminishes the role
of the Board, but it does provide the added safety of keeping the
income at issue from reaching convicts' hand-a contrast from the
revised law that the New York legislature passed.
Model subpart two could specify the requirements of the notice
of claim in the following manner:
2. The notice of claim shall be a form, devised by the
Board, which shall include the following:
(a) the name and address of the claimant, and
(b) a copy of the police report naming the claimant as a
victim of the particular crime for the story of which the
convict received a fee.
The notice would be either filed with the Board by the victim
personally or by his legal representative, or it would be sent
registered mail. The failure of a victim to file notice within the
time periods set out in subpart one would result in the loss to the
victim of the right to involve the state Crime Victims Board; the
victim would, however, retain the rights described in subpart four
of the model statute (which appears below).
The purpose of subpart two is to involve the victim or his
representative more directly in the filing of a claim than did the old
New York law; it could also serve to preserve the victim's
entitlement to the more lenient statute of limitations scheme
available under this model victim compensation law. The notice
of claim requirement would in effect be a condition precedent to
the filing of a claim against the convict's story-telling .income.
This requirement would also serve to effectuate the narrower
tailoring of the model statute.
The model law would continue:
153. See Conrad, supra note 13, at 58 (earlier version of author's proposed "Son of
Sam" law).
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3. On receipt of notice in accord with subpart (2), the
Board shall be empowered to collect income due the
convict under the contract described in subpart (1) and to
deposit that income in an escrow account for the benefit of
or payable to any victim or the legal representative of any
victim of the particular crime for the representation or
depiction of which the convict was paid under the contract.
4. Nothing in this victim compensation law shall detract
from the right of a victim to maintain .an independent,
individual cause of action against the convict for damages
caused by the commission of a crime; the victim or his or
her representative may bring such an action within seven
years of the date of conviction.
Subpart three basically echoes the functional provisions of the old
New York statute; subpart four grants the rights available under the
new New York law. Subpart four gives victims the rights of
judgment creditors to bring a general action for damages suffered
as a result of the crime. In a sense, subpart four actually broadens
the rights of victims by providing added rights in suits against any
of a convicts assets, not just the "royalties" from media works; it
operates here in the manner of a general forfeiture law."'
CONCLUSION
New York took the cautious route in adopting its revised Son
of Sam law. Future Supreme Court decisions may show that New
York was wise to do so. However, the Simon & Schuster decision
left open the possibility of a substantially more victim-friendly
statute than New York enacted. Public demand for some enhanced
procedure to permit crime victims to collect monies made by
convicts from their crimes deserves special consideration.
The public outrage against the selling of David Berkowitz's
story, of course, compelled New York to pass the Son of Sam law
in the first place. The public sense that criminals should not profit
from their crimes seems no less strong today than it was 14 years
154. See N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. §§ 1310-1352 (McKinney Supp. 1992).
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ago. Victims may also feel angered that the overburdened criminal
justice system appears to dole out more plea bargains than
convictions. The fact that the old New York law was rarely used
in its 14-year life does not diminish the outrage of many crime
victims.
The drive to deny criminals the fruits of their crimes is alive
and well. Quite recently, in the highly publicized Sidney J. Reso
kidnapping/murder case, a New Jersey state trial judge sought to
take control of any assets to which defendant Arthur D. Seale
might be entitled from selling his story.1 55 The judge did so
despite the fact that New Jersey, which copied the old New York
law, has yet to pass a new Son of Sam statute. Because of the
great public interest in protecting crime victims and preventing
criminals from profiting from their crimes, the State of New York
should have endeavored to create a stronger law than it did. As
has been demonstrated, it should have been possible to do so
without running afoul of Simon & Schuster. It is not too late for
other states.
155. See Joseph F. Sullivan, Judge Moves to Seize Assets from Reso Kidnapping
Tale, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1992, at B6 (discussing state judge's attempt to establish a fund
to administer any money generated by story-telling by the kidnapper-murderer of Exxon
executive Sidney . Reso).
